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FIL D 
JUN 2 6 1981 
IN THE SUPREME COURT O'------------·-· . 
Cl ... SupNIM Court. Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
WESLEY MULHERIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
- vs -
Case No. 17027 
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---0000000---
The respondent, Ingersoll-Rand Company, pursuant to Rule 
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petitions 
this Court for a rehearing of the matter. 
The respondent submits the following points for rehearing 
and its brief in support thereof: 
1. The adoption of comparative principles in strict pro-
ducts liability should parallel the standard of comparison set 
forth in the Utah Comparative Negligence Act. 
2. Where comparative principles are applied in strict 
liability cases, all of the conduct of the plaintiff that con-
tributes to the cause of the accident should be considered. 
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DATED this 26th day of June, 1981. ji /' 
< ?~~~ dj!, / 
Rich rd H.~-~- _ 
Attorney for Defendan'-Respondent 
Suite 300, 261 East Broadway 
Sa L ke City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
WESLEY MULHERIN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs - Case No. 17027 
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---0000000---
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The statement of kind of case is as set forth in the respon-
dent's original brief on file herein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The disposition in lower court is as set forth in the respon-
dent's original brief on file herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is as set forth in the appellant's 
original brief on file herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES IN 
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY SHOULD PARALLEL 
THE STANDARD OF COMPARISON SET FORTH IN 
THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT. 
In 1973, the Utah Legislature adopted the Utah Comparative 
Negligent Act and determined, as the basis of recovery, that: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery in an action • . . to recover dam-
ages . . . if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery 
is sought • . . . [Section 78-27-37, 
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1953).] 
The Utah Legislature has repeatedly refused to change this policy 
to the "pure comparative negligence" standard this Court has now 
adopted for products liability cases, as set forth in its opinion 
in this matter. S.B. 271, 4lst Session, Utah State Legislature 
(1975); S.B. 123, 43rd Session, Utah State Legislature {1979). 
Indeed, even a change to a 50-50 comparative principle proposed 
in the 1981 session was not enacted. S.B. 256, 44th Session, 
Utah State Legislature .(1981). 
The repeated refusal of the Legislature to alter its policy 
concerning the standard of recovery in comparative negligence is 
a clear indication that the policy of comparative principles to 
be utilized in this state is as set forth in the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, supra. This standard requires that the fault or 
negligence of the plaintiff be less than that of the defendant 
before the plaintiff can recover a percentage of his damages. 
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Contrary to this policy, the Court adopted "pure comparative" 
principles in products liability cases in its opinion herein, 
stating that: 
The defense in a products liability case, where 
both defect and misuse contribute to cause the 
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's re-
covery to that portion of his damages equal to 
the percentage of the cause contributed by the 
product defect. [Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
No. 17027, May 4, 1981.] 
The adoption of "pure comparative fault" principles in pro-
ducts liability cases creates a double standard in the State of 
Utah which not only violates the policy established by the Utah 
Legislature, but creates substantial conceptional problems for 
the courts of this state and places an unfair burden upon manu-
facturers and distributors of products. 
Assume the following facts: John Doe, a construction worker, 
is about to fill his water truck by using a city fire hydrant. 
When he opens the water valve of the hydrant, it explodes and 
seriously injures him. He sues the manufacturer of the hydrant 
for defective product, the city for improper and- negligent mainte-
nance of the hydrant, and the contractor (not his employer) who 
negligently installed the hydrant. The jury determines that the 
plaintiff misused the hydrant in the manner in which he operated 
it, the contractor negligently installed it, the city negligently 
failed to maintain it, and the hydrant was defective in manufacture. 
suppose further, the following jury allocations of fault: 
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Plaintiff 
City 
Contractor 
Manufacturer 
40% 
20% 
20% 
20% 
Pursuant to this finding, the city and the contractor would 
not be joint tortfeasors, as defined by the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act, supra, since their negligence, or gross negli-
gence, is less than that of the plaintiff. Thus, would the 
plaintiff recover 60% of his damages from a manufacturer that 
was only 20% at fault? Or, under the specific holding set forth 
by this Court herein, would the plaintiff recover only 20% of 
his damages, which is "that portion of his damages equal to the 
percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect." 
Mulherin vs. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra. 
More importantly, however, is the question of any recovery 
against the manufacturer in this situation. Why should a manu-
facturer or distributor of a product that is less at fault than 
any of the other parties, including the plaintiff, be held liable 
for damages under this situation when the other defendants, that 
are equally or more at fault, are dismissed with no cause of 
action? This is the result of the double standard created by 
this Court's holding herein. 
The Court stated that it would not express an opinion as to 
other issues created by its holding herein. However, the result 
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of the holding must be analyzed to illuminate the problems 
created by this double standard of comparative principles. 
As previously noted, the Utah Legislature adopted the Com-
parative Negligence Act in 1973. Subsequently, the Legislature 
enacted the Utah Products Liability Act, Section 78-15-1, et 
~.,Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1953). It is significant 
that the Legislature did not alter the existing comparative negli-
gence standard whatsoever when establishing the Utah Products 
Liability Act. In construing legislative intent, it is a well-
established principle that the Legislature is presumed to be 
cognizant of its prior legislative enactments and judicial deci-
sions. Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 wash. 2d 847 (1976), 557 
P.2d 1306; State v. Cutnose, 87 N.M. 300 (1975), 532 P.2d 889; 
Dept. of Revenue v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 169 Mont. 202 
(1976), 545 P.2d 1083; Alter v. Michael, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553, 413 
P.2d 153, 64 C.2d 480 (1966). 
The refusal of the Legislature to alter its stand on the 
standard of comparison as set forth in the Utah Comparative Neg-
ligence Act, supra, when it adopted the Utah Products Liability 
Act, supra, is a clear indication that the Legislature did not 
intend to treat manufacturers and distributors of products dif-
ferently from anyone else! To the contrary, the policy of the 
Legislature was to attempt to more fairly equalize the burdens 
of manufacturers and distributors of products. 
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The policy of the Legislature in adopting the Utah Products 
Liability Act was set forth in Section 78-15-2, Utah Code AnnotatE 
(Repl. Vol. 1953), as follows: 
Legislature findings and declarations--Purpose 
of act.--(1) The legislature finds and declares 
that the number of suits and claims for damages 
and the amount of judgments and settlements 
arising from defective products has increased 
greatly in recent years. Because of these in-
creases, the insurance industry has substantially 
increased the cost of product liability insurance. 
The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims has increased product cost 
through manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers 
passing the cost of premiums to the consumer. 
Further, certain product manufacturers are dis-
couraged from continuing to provide and manufac-
ture such products because of the high cost and 
possible unavailability of product liability in-
surance. 
(2) In view of these recent trends, and 
for the purpose of alleviating the adverse 
effects which these trends are producing in the 
manufacturing industry, it is necessary to pro-
tect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance com-
panies to continue to provide product liability 
insurance . . . . 
Obviously, this Court's ruling herein directly contravenes 
this legislative statement of public policy. The manufacturer or 
distributor of a product may now be held liable for damages even 
though his "fault" is less than the "fault," "negligence" or "gross 
negligence" of other defendants, all of whom may be dismissed froo 
the action because of the greater faulty conduct or misconduct on 
the part of the plaintiff. Such a result is grossly unfair, esta~ 
lishes additional "adverse effects" on the manufacturing industry 
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and ignores the public policy established by the Utah State Legis-
lature. 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the case of Thibault 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (1978), as cited in this 
Court's opinion herein, was faced with the identical problem. The 
New Hampshire Court properly avoided the double standard that is 
created by adopting differing comparative principles. The New 
Hampshire Legislature adopted a comparative negligence statute 
which established that a plaintiff can recover if the jury does 
not find that his negligence was greater than the causal negli-
gence of the defendant. R.S.A. 507:7-a {N.H. Supp. 1977). The 
Court then judicially recognized the comparative concept in strict 
liability cases "parallel to the Legislature's recognition." Id. 
at 850. In so doing, the New Hampshire Court adopted the same 
comparative standard for recovery for the plaintiff so long as 
his misconduct which contributed to the injury was not greater 
than that of the manufacturer. 
The respondent submits that if comparative principles in 
products liability cases are to be applied as the law of this 
jurisdiction, then the policy established by the Utah Legislature 
as the standard of recovery should be applied here. 
II 
WHERE COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES ARE APPLIED 
IN STRICT LIABILITY CASES, ALL OF THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT CONTRIBUTES 
TO THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED. 
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With the adoption of comparative principles in strict pro-
ducts liability actions, whether by "pure" comparison or in 
accordance with the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, supra, it is 
necessary to determine quest1ons of law relative to the defenses 
available to the defendant in such cases. Rule 76, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides, in part, that: 
If a new trial is granted, the court shall 
pass upon and determine all questions of 
law involved in the case presented upon 
appeal and necessary to the final determi-
nation of the case. [Emphasis added.] 
This Court, in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 {Utah 
1979), established only two defenses to products liability claims, 
namely, "(l) misuse of the product by the user or consumer 
and (2) knowledge of the defect by the user or consumer, who is 
aware of the danger and yet unreasonably proceeds to make use of 
the product, i.e., assumption of the risk." Id. at 158. 
The Hahn case preceded the Legislature's adoption of the Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act, supra, and was not an issue therein. 
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act, supra, provides for the 
application of comparative principles to negligence, gross negli-
gence, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. 
This Court has now adopted comparative principles in products 
liability cases in this matter. In products liability cases, 
there are generally three categories of conduct by the injured 
party that must be considered. They are contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and misuse or abuse of the product. There is 
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also the wrongful conduct of other non-manufacturer/distributor 
defendants to be considered. Obviously, there is a wide variety 
in degree of misconduct that falls into each category and, indeed, 
a great deal of overlapping occurs. These "labeling" difficulties 
were noted by this Court in two comparative negligence cases. 
First in Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Assoc., 563 P.2d 1247 
(1977), and, more recently, the distinctions between, and the 
intermingling of, the theories of contributory negligence and 
assumption of the risk were discussed by this Court in Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., No. 16672, May 22, 1981. 
The problems created by trying to make these distinctions in 
products liability cases have been eliminated by adoption of com-
parative principles in some jurisdictions. In California, where 
pure comparative negligence was adopted in Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 
532 P.2d 1126, the Supreme Court, in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 
20 Cal.2d 725, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), adopted the comparative 
standard in products liability cases and, further, allowed consid-
eration of all types of conduct by the plaintiff that contributed 
to the cause of the accident in determining the percentage of fault 
attributable to him. The Court concluded that, "plaintiff's 
recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of 
reasonable care contributed to his injury." Id. at 1168. 
The California Court analyzed the problem of intermingling and 
overlapping of the defenses and stated: 
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The syllogism runs, contributory negligence was 
only a defense to negligence, comparative negli-
gence only affects contributory negligence, 
therefore comparative negligence cannot be a 
defense to strict liability. [See Butaud v. 
Suburban Marine & Sport Goods, Inc. (Alaska 
1976), 555 P.2d 42, 47. While fully recog-
nizing the theoretical and semantic distinc-
tions between the twin principles of strict 
products liability and traditional negligence, 
we think they can be blended or accommodated 
. • . • We acknowledged an intermixing of 
defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk and formally effected a 
type of merger . . . . Id. at 1167. 
We think, accordingly, the conclusion may 
fairly be drawn that the terms "comparative 
negligence," "contributory negligence" and 
"assumption of risk" do not, standing alone, 
lend themselves to the exact measurements of 
amicrometer-caliper, or to such precise defi-
nition as to divert us from otherwise strong 
and consistent countervailing policy consid-
erations. Fixed semantic consistency at this 
point is less important than the attainment 
of a just and equitable result. The inter-
weaving of concept and terminology in this 
area suggests a judicial posture that is 
flexible rather than doctrinaire. Id. at 1168. 
We do not permit plaintiff's own conduct rela-
tive to the product to escape unexamined, and 
as to that share of plaintiff's damages which 
flows from his own fault we discern no reason 
of policy why it should, following Li, be 
borne by others. Such a result woul"Crdirectly 
contravene the principle announced in Li, that 
loss should be assessed equitably in propor-
tion to fault. 
We conclude, accordingly, that the expressed 
purposes which persuaded us in the first 
instance to adopt strict liability in Cali-
fornia would not be thwarted were we to apply 
comparative principles. What would be forfeit 
is a degree of semantic symmetry. However, in 
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this evolving area of tort law in which new 
remedies are judicially created, and old de-
fenses judicially merged, impelled by strong 
consideration of equity and fairness, we seek 
a larger synthesis. If a more just result 
follows from the expansion of comparative 
principles, we have no hesitancy in seeking 
it, mindful always that the fundamental and 
underlying purpose of Li was to promote the 
equitable allocation or-loss among all 
parties legally responsible in proportion to 
their fault. Id. at 1169. 
Thus, the California Court that lead the way in adopting the 
theory of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, has 
now recognized the difficulty in making the distinctions between 
these various defenses and, therefore, has eliminated them. 
Other authorities have determined that negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff, other than the failure to discover or guard 
against a defect, is recognized as a defense. 
The standard of strict products liability that was adopted 
by this Court in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., supra, is set forth in 
Restatement (2d) Law of Torts, Section 402a. As noted in 
comment n of that section, contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense only when such negligence consists merely 
in a failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard 
against the possibility of its existence. The Restatement does 
not preclude other forms of contributory negligence as a defense 
to products liability claims. 
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This defense was noted in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
336 So.2d 80 {Fla. 1976). The Florida Supreme Court stated that 
We recognize that contributory negligence of 
the user or consumer or bystander in the sense 
of a failure to discover a defect, or to guard 
against the possibility of its existence, is 
not a defense. Contributory negligence of the 
consumer or user by unreasonable use of a pro-
duct after discovery of the defect and the 
danger is a valid defense. Prior to the adop-
tion of the comparative negligence doctrine, a 
plaintiff's conduct as the sole proximate 
cause of his injuries would constitute a total 
defense. See Coleman v. American Universal of 
Florida, rnc:-, 264 So.2d 451 (Fla. Appl. 1st 
1972), quoting from 2 Furner and Friedman 
Products Liability, Section 16.01(3), at 3-20 
to 3-31. The defendant manufacturer may 
assert that the plaintiff was negligent in some 
specified manner other than failing to discover 
or guard against a defect, such as assuming the 
risk, or misusing the product, and that such 
negligence was a substantial proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries or damages. See Annot., 
13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1100-1101. The fact that 
plaintiff acts or fails to act as a reasonable, 
prudent person, and such conduct proximately 
contributes to his injury, constitutes a valid 
defense. In other words, lack of ordinary due 
care could constitute a defense to strict tort 
liability. 
As noted, the Florida Court relied upon Annot., Products Li~ 
bility: Strict Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1101, whereii 
the following statement appears: 
Also, the defendant may assert that the plain-
tiff was negligent in some specified manner 
other than failing to discover or guard against 
a defect, assuming the risk, or misusing the 
product, and that such negligence was a sub-
stantial, proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries or damages. 
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The issue of comparison of all the conduct of the plaintiff is 
important in the retrial of this matter. In the trial, the jury 
never reached the issues of assumption of risk or other negligent 
conduct on the part of Mr. Mulherin. The jury was instructed to 
return a verdict upon a finding of misuse by the plaintiff. 
Since only the issue of misuse by Mr. Mulherin has been de-
termined relative to the available defenses, the retrial of this 
matter must consider other available defenses. The respondent 
respectfully submits that all of the negligent conduct of Mr. 
Mulherin, or any other person or entity that might be involved, 
should be considered in apportioning the relative degrees of 
"fault," as has been done in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the policy of the 
State of Utah has been clearly established by the Legislature as 
it relates to the principles of comparative fault. This Court 
should not adopt a policy of pure comparative fault in products 
liability cases where the Legislature has repeatedly refused to 
adopt such a policy in relation to the Utah Comparative Negligence 
Act. This Court should avoid the creation of a double standard 
and adopt a comparative system parallel with that established by 
the Utah Legislature. 
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With the application of comparative principles to strict pre 
ducts liability cases, all of the conduct of the parties should t 
considered in establishing the relative degrees of fault attribu-
table to each. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of June, 1981. 
Ricijard H. ,Moffat/ .· J; 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Suite 300, 261 Rast Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ohn- L~ung 
··ftorn /or D ndant-Respondent 
Suite(.3_0-0, 261 East Broadway 
Salt ta'ke City, Utah 84111 
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